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WHEN A NEW SHERIFF COMES TO TOWN:
THE IMPENDING SHOWDOWN BETWEEN THE
U.S. TRADE COURTS AND THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION
GREGORY HUSIsIAN*

This is the first time I have entered a law school classroom in
the last twelve years. I see that some things never change, such
as the unwritten rule that law students never sit in the first row.
In twelve years as a trade practitioner, another unwritten rule

that also is never broken is that as long as there is free trade,
there will be free trade disputes.
This is an appropriate time for us to be talking about trade
issues. The International Trade Commission is currently
considering the largest safeguard action ever, involving steel,'
and the Department of Commerce is close to announcing the final
determination in the countervailing duty investigation regarding
Softwood Lumber from Canada, which is probably the largest
2
countervailing duty case ever brought anywhere in the world.
'Gregory Husisian, counsel to the law firm of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, specializes in
international trade law, public policy, and litigation. His practice includes advising
companies with regard to antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings,
international sanctions, and compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Prior to
entering private practice, Mr. Husisian clerked for Judge Jerry E. Smith of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Mr. Husisian is a 1990 graduate of Cornell Law School and a
1987 graduate of Cornell University.
This article was originally given as a speech at St. John's law school. The author
thanks Jennifer J. Rhodes for her thoughtful help in the preparation of this speech, and
the members of the St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary for their excellent work in
researching and preparing the footnotes necessary to turn this speech into this article.
1 Presidential Proclamation No. 7529: To Facilitate Positive Adjustment to
Competition from Imports of Certain Steel Products, 67 Fed. Reg. 10,553 (Mar. 5, 2002).
See Foreign Law Year in Review: 2001: Canadian Law, 36 INr'L LAW. 753 n.36 (2002)
(noting the International Trade Commission's conclusion in a global steel safeguard
action that steel imports are seriously injuring the U.S. steel industry). See generally
Section 201-204 of the Trade Act of 1974 as amended; 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2254.
2 See Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 67 Fed. Reg. 15,545 (Dep't
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And while the passage of these landmarks may go unnoticed by
people outside the international trade community, the way that
these two cases - and scores of ongoing trade disputes in less
high-profile trade disputes - are resolved will impact nearly
every U.S. consumer, including everyone who is having a house
built or who purchases anything made from steel. When you
think of the billions of dollars of trade that happens each year for
these two products alone, and the wide variety of downstream
products made from them, the impact that 20, 25, or 30 percent
additional ad valorem antidumping or countervailing duty tariffs
can have on U.S. consumers and the U.S. economy is readily
apparent. It quickly adds up to a lot of money that is paid by
virtually every U.S. business and consumer.
Although the antidumping and countervailing duty laws have
their roots in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when
an appreciation of the advantages of free trade was becoming
mainstream economic thinking, antidumping and countervailing
duty actions are really mercantilist throwbacks to the idea that
national prosperity flows from protecting domestic industries.
Since the beginnings of Adam Smith's work on comparative
advantage, most economists have come to accept that free trade
affords worldwide economic and social benefits, and that the
lowering of tariffs and the elimination of artificial barriers to
trade, even if not reciprocated, works primarily to the advantage
of the nation opening its economy. The economic benefits from
such actions can be direct, such as increased competitiveness of
firms that consume imports in making their own products and
increased consumer choice, and indirect, such as the gains that
occur through competition based upon comparative advantage,
which increases aggregate efficiency and worldwide output, and
the role that increased competition has in pushing firms to
innovate and compete harder. Countries that have embraced free
trade, such as the United States, may sometimes see harmful
impacts on industries that are not competitive or are unable to
make products or sell services that satisfy consumer desires, but
the economies of countries that are open to free trade have
generally grown at a faster pace than their protected
counterparts. As President Bush said in his 2002 State of the
Commerce Apr. 2, 2002) (final determination).
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Union Address, good jobs depend on expanded trade.3 The U.S.
Trade Representative estimates that exports support one in five
U.S. manufacturing jobs, many of which are the highest paid of
all manufacturing jobs, and that increased trade due to the
implementation of the WTO Agreements alone boosts U.S. gross
4
domestic product by 125-150 billion dollars per year.
But not everyone agrees that free trade is a good idea. Most
recent assaults on the free trade orthodoxy focus on claims that
free trade fosters a "race to the bottom" for countries that seek a
comparative advantage based upon lax labor and environmental
laws, and some critics claim that rather than encouraging
economic efficiency through the exploitation of comparative
advantage, free trade instead encourages developing countries to
adopt a short-term emphasis on the production of a few
(primarily agricultural or low-tech) products, which fosters
dependence and poverty rather than the development of a
diversified and stable economy. 5 Most recently, criticism has
focused on the role of "hot money" - liquid investment money
that is quickly withdrawn at the first sign of political or economic
trouble, which is when stability is most needed, such as during
6
the 1998 Asian currency crisis.
And then there are the issues of separating trade winners from
trade losers. Stakeholders in mature industries, such as the U.S.
steel industry, worry that free trade is a license for foreign
companies to exploit their unfettered access to the world's largest
market. Foreign subsidies can prop up inefficient foreign
3 See The State of the Union: President Bush's State of the Union Address to
Congress and the Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at A22. As President Bush stated,
"[glood jobs depend on expanded trade. Selling into new markets creates new jobs, so I
ask Congress to finally approve trade promotion authority."
4 See, e.g., USTR, "The World Trade Organization Works For You," available at
http://www.ustr.gov/htm]Iwto4you.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2003); Why Manufacturing
Matters to the U.S. Economy, FDCH Fed. Dep't. and Agency Docs. (Feb. 5, 2000) (stating
that manufacturing work represents nearly seventy percent of United States export
value).
5 See Blair Pethel, Pushing Bush Trade Power: Firms Want More Negotiating
Strength for Him, CHI. SUN TIMES, May 20, 2001, at 40 (noting that critics of free trade
agreements argue that they "erode workers' rights and environmental standards by
triggering a 'race to the bottom,' where nations are forced to compete by lowering
production costs").
6 See, e.g., East Asians 'DeserveBigger Voice' at IMF; It Will Ensure Region's Needs
Are Better Served, Says Prof, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), July 11, 2002 (defining hot
money as "short-term capital funds which can wreak havoc on vulnerable economies").
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competitors, thereby altering supply conditions and creating
competition that has no right to exist. You also have a dichotomy
between people who stress expanding the size of the pie and
those who care about dividing up the pie more equitably, a goal
which some say is frustrated by free trade. These are not easy
issues, and they are ones that the United States is now dealing
with in the context of a recession, which makes the concerns
harder to balance.
All these issues are coming to a head at a time when political
support for free trade for foreign policy reasons is waning.
Formerly, it was the conscious policy of the U.S. government to
encourage free trade as a way of rebuilding foreign economies
devastated by World War 11.7 The role of the United States as a
free trade standard bearer is not surprising. We are one of the
most successful examples of free trade, which occurs within the
context of the 50 states. Ohio does not collect a special tariff
when Ford ships a car from Detroit to Toledo, because the U.S.
Constitution has guaranteed that the United States operates as
the largest and longest-lasting true free trade zone in the world. 8
Nor do you find restrictions on the movement of capital and labor
from one state to another. This has allowed relative uniformity in
the economic development of the United States as firms seek to
take advantage of incipient wage disparities, and is a level of
freedom that the European Union is only now starting to
embrace. In fact, one of the principal reasons why the founding
fathers crafted the Constitution and discarded the flawed
Articles of Confederation was because competition between the
states and actions taken to protect local industries were working
against the common good of political and economic unity. One
can, of course, make a good argument that there is no difference
between the advantages of free trade among states and among
nation states. Certainly this was the view of the U.S. government
through the end of the cold war, and the government was not shy
about using free trade and access to the world's largest market as
7 See, e.g., David D. Hale, Twilight ofAnglo-American Power,CHI. TRIBUNE, June 19,
1987, at 25C (observing that the United States was a "natural supporter" of free trade
following World War II when it used its "overwhelming technological superiority" to aid
its former enemies in rebuilding their nations).
8 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress exclusive power "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
tribes").

2003]

WHENA NEWSHERIFFCOMES TO TOWN

a means to stitch allies into the U.S. economic fabric.
But while it was easy for the U.S. government to be a force for
free trade when the economy was strong, and U.S. firms
dominant due to the unparalleled comparative strength of the
U.S. economy after World War II, the landscape today has
changed. Nearly all U.S. industries face significant foreign
competition, and as the U.S. government has more than
occasionally acceded to domestic pressure for protectionism, the
authority of the U.S. government to act as a free trade advocate
is, in the view of many critics and foreign governments,
unraveling. 9 Foreign governments and firms see the Bush
Administration talking loudly about the benefits of trade but
then putting in place safeguard tariffs against steel products.O
They see a push for cutting back subsidy programs abroad, but
then stare in shock when the U.S. government enacts a hugely
expensive new subsidy program for U.S. farmers. II A government
that pushes free trade when it is in the interests of the United
States but backs off when it seemingly is not comes across not as
a leader, but as a selfish opportunist.
One aspect of U.S. economic policy that has long drawn the ire
of many foreign governments is a peculiarly U.S. attachment to
industry-specific trade remedies, such as antidumping duty,
countervailing duty, and safeguard proceedings. Largely due to
concerns about the way these U.S. laws are applied, foreign
nations have pushed for increasing restrictions on such actions,
culminating in specific rules and obligations in the WTO
Agreements. For many nations, the key reason for proceeding
with a new round of WTO Agreements will be to strengthen the
WTO rules and limitations on the reach of such actions. 12
9 See, e.g., David Crane, US. FacesFierceAttack From OECD, TORONTO STAR, May
17, 2002, at E03 (stating U.S. protection of American companies has caused the nation to
come under attack "as the bad boy of the global economy").
10 See, e.g., Elizabeth Olson, WTO Loophole Allows a Surge in Protectionism,N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 2002, at Wi (stating that the safeguard exception in the World Trade
Organization rules has permitted the Bush administration to justify selective tariffs on
steel imports).
11 See, e.g., Ken Bohl, Bush Is Right on DroughtAid, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 9, 2002,
at 8A (calling the $190 billion agricultural subsidy bill Congress passed in the spring of
2002 "hugely expensive").
12 See Brazil's Barbosa Says WTO Talks Stalled on Developing Country Issues,
Daily Report for Executives, Dec. 9, 2002, at A-16; WTO Appellate Body OverturnsRuling
Against US. CountervailingDuty Law, Daily Report for Executives, Dec. 10, 2002, at A-
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Even the rules in place right now are having an impact. Since
its inception in 1994, almost 300 trade disputes have been
brought to the WTO.13 The increasing development of WTO
jurisprudence through the resolution of these disputes is a
fascinating process to watch. It's like watching the development
of Constitutional jurisprudence in the nineteenth century or
antitrust law in the early twentieth century following the
passage of the Sherman Act. A body of WTO law is being
developed right before our eyes as the WTO Panels grapple with
filling in the gaps in the very broad and aspirational WTO rules
4
in the context of specific disputes. 1
The U.S. Government has been one of the most frequent
participants in this whole process, where it has been both a
winner, such as with regard to the high-profile bananas
dispute, 15 and a loser, such as with regard to U.S. regulations
regarding trawl fishing and the inadvertent ways in which nets

19; WTO Issues PreliminaryRuling Striking Down US. Steel Safeguard,Daily Report for
Executives, Mar. 27, 2003, at A-15. See generallyD. Ravi Kanth, WTO Sees UrgentNeed
for Fresh Trade Talks, BUS. TIMES (Singapore), May 24, 2001, at 18 (stating that the
World Trade Organization's 2001 Annual Report noted that, among other things, a new
round of trade negotiations would set new rules addressing "issues raised by pressure
groups in their campaign against globalization").
For a good overview of the intersection between U.S. and WTO rules, see American Bar
Ass'n, Section of International Law and Practice, The World Trade Organization:
Multilateral Trade Framework for the 21st Century and US. Implementing Legislation
(1996), especially chapter 8 (Alan M. Dunn, Antidumping), chapter 9 (M. Jean Anderson
and Gregory Husisian, The SubsidiesAgreement), and chapter 10 (James R. Cannon, Jr.,
Dispute Settlement in Antidumping and CountervaiingDutyCases).
13 See, e.g., Publication of the WTO - WTO Dispute Settlement: The Disputes,
(last
available at http://www.wto.orglenglis/tratop-e/dispu.e/dispu-e.htm#disputes
visited Apr. 12, 2003). See generally Edward Alden & Guy de Jonquieres, US. Looks
Poised to Turn Words Into Action on GM Crops: A WTO Case Against the EU Could
Imperil Efforts to Inject Momentum Into the Doha Trade Round, FIN. TIMES (London),
Jan. 14, 2003, at 8 (observing that the World Trade Organization has been called on to
adjudicate many transatlantic trade disputes since the mid-1990s).
14 Not everyone is equally fascinated by these developments. As this article was going
to press, Senator Baucus (D-Mont.) was introducing legislation that would establish an
independent Commission to review WTO dispute-settlement decisions. According to
Senator Baucus, this Commission is needed because WTO panels "have stopped
interpreting trade agreements and instead have begun legislating." Gary Yerkey, "Sen.
Baucus Introduces Bill Creating Commission to Review WTO Decisions," 55 Daily Report
for Executives A-19 (Mar. 21, 2003).
15 WTO, Report of the Panel, European Communities - Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distributionof Bananas,WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997); see, e.g., Raj Bhala,
The Bananas War, 31 McGeorge L. Rev. 839, 848-52 (2000) (describing the background
and ramifications of the WTO ruling on the bananas dispute); Bert Wilkinson, Island
Nations Plan to Seek Libya Aid, SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 2, 2001, at 16A (noting that the
United States was successful in its complaint to the World Trade Organization that the
European Union did not levy duties on Caribbean bananas).
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can trap turtles in the process. 16 As the most frequent victims of
foreign trade barriers, it is safe to say that, on net, U.S.
companies (and the U.S. economy) have probably benefited more
than they have lost. But regardless of whether one agrees with
this assertion, it is clear that the role of the WTO as a global
entity with a role in policing trade disputes has been having a
very real impact on worldwide economic and even foreign policy,
including with regard to the United States.
The growing role of the WTO in the resolution of trade disputes
is setting up a collision course between the (largely) free trade
principles the WTO implements and the (largely) protectionist
U.S. trade laws, such as the antidumping duty and
countervailing duty statutes. These laws never were intended to
foster free trade. The first countervailing duty law was put in
place to protect late nineteenth century sugar producers from
foreign subsidies, and never outgrew its protectionist roots.1 7
Even after substantial changes in 1979 and 1994 to comply with
new GATT and WTO rules, 8 an observer from 1930 might have
to adjust to new terminology, but would have little difficulty
recognizing the current law.19 The same is true of the
Antidumping Act of 1921,20 which also has been amended several
times but still remains at its heart the same kind of remedy
against price discrimination between the U.S. and foreign
markets that was put in place at its inception. 2 1
16 See, e.g., Julie B. Master, Note: International Trade Trmmps Domestic
EnvironmentalProtection:Dolphins and Sea Turtles Are "Sacrificedon the Altar of Free
Trade,"12 TEMP. INT'L & CoMM. L. 423, 447-48 (1998).
17 See Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, ch. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 151, 205 (1897) (including
provisions to ensure tariff levels on non-enumerated goods are high).
18 See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979)
(providing substantive provisions to implement GATT agreements); Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (implementing agreements
from the Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations).
19 See Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590, 672 & 685 (1930) (amended 1979,
1994) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1671 et. seq.) (implementing a framework for
countervailing duties).
20 See Pub. L. No. 67-10, § 201, 42 Stat. 9, 11 (1921) (marking beginning of
antidumping duty provisions).
21 See Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590, 672 & 685 (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. §§ 1673-1677) (providing operative provisions for antidumping actions); see also
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (amending
antidumping provisions of Tariff Act of 1930); Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L.
No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (incorporating U.S. treaty obligations under the Uruguay
Round of WTO negotiations to antidumping laws found in the Tariff Act of 1930).
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Despite half-hearted claims to the contrary, primarily by firms
that rely upon such laws as part of their competitive strategy,
there really is no question that the laws continue to be more
concerned with protectionism than with righting the supposed
trade distorting impact of foreign behavior. For example, there
are normally six voting Commissioners on the U.S. International
Trade Commission, so it is not uncommon to have tie votes.
Under the statute, however, a tie vote does not go in favor of free
trade - the tie vote is deemed to be the equivalent of an
affirmative determination, which would result in the imposition
of antidumping or countervailing duties. 2 2 Even in five-year
"sunset" reviews, where the presumption is supposed to be that
an order will be revoked unless there is a clear indication that
revocation would lead to the "continuation or recurrence of
material injury,"23 a tie vote at the International Trade
Commission is construed as a victory for the U.S. industry and
results in the retention of the order.2 4 Any law that breaks ties in
favor of protectionism cannot be construed as neutral. And there
are many other examples of a tilted playing field, which
primarily arise in arcane rules regarding how subsidies and the
magnitude of dumping are calculated, such as the concept of
"zeroing," which is discussed below.
Even the procedures governing trade disputes are designed to
foster victories by U.S. firms. For example, a domestic firm is
allowed to consult with both the Department of Commerce and
the International Trade Commission before bringing a petition to
request that a case be initiated. 2 5 This is quite extraordinary, as
the same agencies then will be deciding whether the U.S. or the
foreign industries will prevail, as well as the margin that will be
22 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (11) (1999) (defining what constitutes an affirmative
determination when the Commission is divided).
23 See id. § 1675(c) (providing a procedure for automatic five-year reviews of
antidumping and countervailing duty orders). The relatively low number of revocations of
antidumping and countervailing duty orders in sunset reviews has led twelve countries to
call for the amendment of the WTO rules to make clear that the retention of orders should
only occur rarely, where it is clear that revocation would be likely to lead to the
recurrence or continuation of material injury. See Daniel Pruzin, "Friends"Group Targets
Sunset Reviews in Latest WTO Proposalon Antidumping, 54 Daily Report for Executives
A-15 (Mar. 20, 2003).
24 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (11) (clarifying the procedure used when the Commission is
divided in a § 1675 sunset determination).
25 See U.S. Department of Commerce, Antidumping Manual (1998), ch. 2 at 2,
available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/admanual/index.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2003)
(delineating procedures under antidumping laws).
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applied. In light of this and other home field advantages, it is not
surprising that the overwhelming majority of cases brought
result in affirmative dumping and countervailing duty findings
26
at the agencies.
It is against this backdrop that the Court of International
Trade operates. Both the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
and the Court of International Trade have, as Chief Judge
Carman just mentioned, extended Chevron deference to the
findings of the agencies, 2 7 which the Federal Circuit has
described as the "masters" of the trade statutes. 28 So what this
means is that you have a statute that is designed to be
protectionist, interpreted in a protectionist way by the agencies
involved, all of which is reviewed under a deferential standard of
review.
None of this is new, but in the wake of new WTO rigor, it takes
on especially interesting connotations. With the WTO dispute
resolution process often being the end-point of trade disputes,
and with simultaneous appeals now often being brought before
both to the CIT and the WTO, the potential for differing
outcomes in national and WTO appeals increasingly exists. This
means that the free-trade WTO principles often are on a collision
course with the more protectionist trade remedies that are
reluctantly allowed by the WTO Agreements.
Right now, there are three ongoing examples of these types of
collisions. The first is the concept of "zeroing" in an antidumping
duty calculation. If you have one sale that is ten percent above
the normal value (i.e., the foreign comparison price or, if
relevant, the foreign cost) and another that is ten percent below,
it might seem that these two sales negate each other, yielding a
net dumping margin of zero. But that is not the interpretation
26 See Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping Law, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.
1, 4 (1995) (stating that the Department of Commerce found dumping in 90% of
investigations initiated pursuant to industry petitions).
27 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984) (explaining Congressional intent of delegating responsibility to agencies to allow
them broad discretion in their decisions).
28 See Consumer Products Div., SCM Corp. v. Silver Reed America., Inc., 753 F.2d
1033, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating with regard to the Department of Commerce that "we
must give reasonable deference to the expertise of the agency, i.e., the 'masters of the
subject'") (quoting National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477
(1979)).
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that the Department of Commerce has taken, which believes that
U.S. law requires that it focus solely on instances of "targeted"
dumping while not giving any offsetting credit for sales that have
a negative dumping margin. 29 Because those sales that exceed
the normal value are treated as having a dumping margin of
zero, the dumping margin calculated in this example would be
five, not ten, percent.
The Court of International Trade has noted that this practice
might be interpreted as being inherently unfair, but nonetheless
upheld it by stating that it is not the place of a court to overturn
the Department's interpretation of its own statute unless it is
unreasonable. 30 The WTO, however, has stated that this practice,
when indulged in by other countries, violates the WTO AntiDumping Agreement. 3 1 Everyone expects that there will soon be
a ruling in one of the cases currently before the WTO challenging
the same U.S. practice. Inevitably, such a decision will be cited to
the Court of International Trade as requiring that the Court
revisit its own affirmance of the same practice. 32
Another example arises from safeguard measures, such as
29 See Timothy C. Brightbill, et al, International Trade, 35 INT'L LAW. 407, 425
(2001) (discussing a panel ruling against the European Community and indicating the
Department of Commerce still follows "zeroing" policies).
30 See Bowe Passat Reinigungs-Und Waschereitechnik Gmbh. v. United States, 926
F. Supp. 1138, 1150 (Ct. Int'l Trade, 1996) (stating that the Court must defer to the
Department's interpretation of the statute unless it is clear that zeroing is "impermissible
or unreasonable").
31 See Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, WTO Case Review 2001, 19 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 457, 534 (2002) (discussing the WTO ruling against EC for zeroing negative
dumig margins).
As this article was being finalized, the Court of International Trade promulgated a
decision that appears to be contrary to the recent trend of the trade Courts paying closer
attention to WTO arguments. In Corus Staai BVet al. v. United States Department of
Commerce, Consol. Ct. No. 02-0003, Slip Op. 03-25 (Mar. 7, 2003), the Court squarely
confronted the issue of whether the U.S. practice of zeroing was inconsistent with the
WTO Agreement.
Although the Court acknowledged that the "circumstances and
methodology in this case appear to be very similar, if not identical, to the Bed Linen
investigation" (the WTO case declaring that the practice of zeroing violated the AntiDumping Agreement), the court concluded that because "WTO decisions appear to have
very limited precedential value and are binding only upon the particular countries
involved," it would not rely upon the contrary WTO decision to strike down the
Department's zeroing practice. Id. at 17-18. Instead, the Court declared that "[wlhen
faced with an ambiguous statute and ambiguous international agreement, the court
should defer to Commerce's interpretation." Id. at 19. Since it is widely expected that
there will soon be a WTO case involving zeroing by the United States, the decision
probably only postpones the issue temporarily.
Moreover, the approach to WTO
precedent in the Corus case appears to be inconsistent with the approach take by the
Court in other recent opinions, which may mean that a definitive resolution of the extent
to which WTO determinations are relevant in U.S. proceedings may need to be
established by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
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those ongoing with regard to various steel products. Because of
the way the statute is structured, these are not cases that go
before the Court of International Trade, but they are still of
interest because there is a question of causation that is common
to both safeguard and antidumping/countervailing duty cases. In
both types of cases there is a requirement that imports be the
"cause" of injury. 33 Thus, the WTO resolution of causation issues
in safeguard cases bears on the likely resolution of analogous
issues in antidumping and countervailing duty cases.
This is important because the United States has lost four
straight WTO safeguard disputes, involving woven wool shirts,34
wheat gluten, 35 lamb meat, 36 and line pipe. 3 7 In each of these
cases, the WTO has struck down a U.S. safeguard measure due
to a finding that the causation standard applied by the
International Trade Commission in the Section 201 proceedings
is contrary to the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. These cases
likely are precursors to a more rigorous approach by the WTO to
causation in antidumping and countervailing duty actions. Such
cases would, in turn, reinforce attempts by parties in domestic
appeals to reverse
affirmative
determinations
of the
International Trade Commission on the grounds that causation
was not adequately established.
A final example is one that is very familiar to Chief Judge
33 See Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States, 132 F.3d 716, 719 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(defining material injury and factors used to determine the existence thereof, including a
causation requirement).
34 WTO, Report of the Panel, United States - Measure Affecting Imports of Woven
Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/R (Jan. 6, 1997). See John Zarocostas,
WTO to Examine Indian Complaints of Woolen Garment Import Curbs by US., J. OF
COMMERCE, Apr. 18, 1996, at 3A (describing dispute over woven wool shirts).
35 WTO, Report of the Panel, United States - Defimitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities,WT/DS166/R (July 31, 2000).
See Joel W. Rogers & Joseph P. Whitlock, Is Section 337 Consistent with the GATT and
the TRIPs Agreement?, 17 AM U. INT'L L. REV. 459, 466 n.21 (2002) (noting the U.S. was
found to have violated the Agreement on Safeguards with regard to wheat gluten).
36 WTO, Report of the Panel, United States - Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand andAustralia, WT/DS177/R and
WT/DS178/R (Dec. 21, 2000). See Trade Scene: Bush Now a Man of Steel, J. OF
COMMERCE, Mar. 13, 2002 (discussing adverse decisions for U.S. in WTO dispute
settlements in general and on the issue of lamb).
37 WTO, Report of the Panel, United States - Detrmitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, WT/DS202IR (Oct. 29,
2001). See Elizabeth Olson, WTO Loophole Allows a Surge in Protectionism,N.Y. TIMES,
June 13, 2002 at 1 (noting that the WTO has not endorsed any safeguard measure
brought before it, including a U.S. piping tariff).
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Carman of this Panel. Under the countervailing duty law, a
subsidy does not exist unless there is a "financial contribution"
that provides a "benefit" to a producer. But what happens when
the producer that received the subsidy was a government-owned
entity that subsequently was privatized in an arms-length
transaction for fair market value? The simple answer is that you
should do nothing if you truly care about only countervailing
distortionary subsidies. Let's say that I have a car to sell that is
worth $3,000. But instead of selling it as is, I first put $1,000 in
the trunk. Unless people are acting irrationally, the fair market
price would now be $4,000, and the fact that there is a $1,000
subsidy in the trunk of the car would have no impact on the price
received for the actual car - the subsidy, in other words, is
extinguished by the fact that the sale occurred at arms length in
the marketplace. The same reasoning would apply equally to a
factory or an entire company - any subsidy would be
extinguished if you have a true arms length market value
transaction. But the Department of Commerce has resisted this
view very strenuously, on the asserted grounds that certain
kinds of arms-length transactions could somehow result in the
subsidy being transferred along with the assets to the new buyer.
When this issue came 'up on appeal before Chief Judge Carman
in 1994, the Court of International Trade ruled against the
Department's methodology, 38 but the Federal Circuit (in
Saarstahl v. United States) reversed, finding that the
Department's methodology for finding that certain subsidies
could survive privatization, even if it occurred in an arms length
transaction, was reasonable. 39
The story does not end there, however. When the Department's
privatization rules were challenged at the WTO by the European
Union, the subsequent ruling held that the Department's rules
improperly presumed that the benefit of a pre-privatization
subsidy passed through to the new entity. And in a subsequent
case in the Federal Circuit (Delverde SrL v. United States), the
Court acknowledged the WTO case and noted the consistency of
its resolution with the WTO approach when it subsequently
38 Saarstahl v. United States, 858 F. Supp. 187 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994).
39 Saarstahl v. United States, 78 F.3d 1539, 1544 (1996), rev'd, 177 F.3d 1314 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (reversing Court of International Trade decision and finding Commerce's
approach to be reasonable).
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revised its approach to privatization.40
The Delverde Court's reference to the consistency of its opinion
with the determination of a WTO Panel might have been an
aside, but in the Court of International Trade, the number of
determinations that have noted or cited WTO obligations or the
decisions of WTO Panels has been growing sharply.41 This is
quite a change. Historically, the trade courts paid little attention
to GATT opinions. Relevant GATT rulings tended to be fewer and
farther between - not as many cases were brought before GATT
panels, the issues decided were much more nebulous, and the
determinations were not implementing the same kind of rules
that you have in the WTO, which are more detailed and place
more constraints on the ways that the member states have
agreed to implement their antidumping and countervailing duty
laws. Thus, we now have a situation where two separate legal
entities are reviewing similar or even the same agency decisions.
Moreover, since the Supreme Court long ago announced in the
CharmingBetsy case that U.S. statutes should not be interpreted
to violate U.S. international commitments unless no other
construction of the statute is possible, the potential for WTO
decisions influencing the resolution of appeals in the Court of
International Trade and the Federal Circuit is apparent. 4 2
In short, there are four reasons why the U.S. trade courts are
increasingly attuned to, and increasingly considering the
consistency of agency actions with, U.S. WTO obligations. The
first is the relative specificity of the WTO versus its predecessors,
which means that you are going to find targeted rulings by the
WTO on technical topics that formerly would not have been a
40 Delverde SrL v. United States, 202 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that
the WTO and the Court's decision were not at odds).
41 See, e.g., Timken Co. v. United States, 2002 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 106, at *20-21
(Ct. Int'l Trade 2002) (noting WTO interpretation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement);
Usinor v. United States, 2002 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 98, at *15-16 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002);
Viraj Forgings Ltd. v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1296 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002);
Hyundai Electronics Co., Ltd. v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1343-44 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1999) (noting that although WTO decisions are not binding, they may be useful to a
Court's determination); Caterpillar Inc. v. United States, 941 F. Supp. 1241, 1247 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1996) (comparing U.S. law to international trade law). But see Corus StaalBV
et a]. v. United States Department of Commerce, Consol. Ct. No. 02-0003, Slip Op. 03-25
(Mar. 7, 2003) (described in detail, supra note 32).
42 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 64, 118 (1804) (noting
that, unless no other view is possible, a U.S. court should construe U.S. statutes in
accordance with U.S. international obligations).
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subject of a GATT proceeding. The second is that, with the WTO
being used much more frequently, the potential for there being
an on-point WTO decision is much higher. This overlap also
occurs because more and more parties are pursuing simultaneous
appeals (i.e., direct appeals to the Court of International Trade
and influencing governments to bring WTO challenges). The
third is that the free trade inclinations of the WTO panels and
appellate bodies, and their general view that they are trying to
sweep away unnecessary trade barriers, often conflict with more
protectionist agency determinations. Finally, the number of trade
cases being filed is not slowing down, and lawyers for both the
U.S. and foreign industries are keeping in mind the potential for
a WTO case at the start, and directing the arguments and
developing a record that will help set up the most favorable
WTO-type arguments in the event that the final results are
challenged in that forum. This will result in more cases where
both the WTO and the Court of International Trade are hearing
appeals of the same determinations. So for all these reasons, it is
not surprising that WTO arguments are being heard more and
more often before the Court of International Trade and the
Federal Circuit, and that U.S. and WTO decisionmakers are
increasingly on a collision course with one another.
Whether these additional WTO determinations are a learned
body of opinion that can be helpful and provide guidance on
interpreting analogous U.S. provisions or just a distraction to the
traditional legal argumentation heard by the Courts will
undoubtedly vary from case to case. Moreover, since U.S. law
specifically provides that there is no private right of action to
enforce U.S. WTO obligations, WTO arguments will always be
cast in a supporting rather than a starring role in domestic
appeals of trade decisions. But the potential for WTO
argumentation being relevant now exists in every appeal that is
brought. Whether you think this is a good development may well
depend on whether your free trade views lean more towards
those of the U.S. Business Roundtable or the WTO protesters,
but it is inevitable that the role that the WTO plays in the
resolution of trade disputes and in the disposition of appeals in
trade courts will only grow over the coming years.

